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ABSTRACT 
 
The German Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB) initiated the Wasla/HALE project 
in 2000 to investigate, develop and test suitable technologies for operation of UAVs in controlled airspace. The 
Wasla/HALE project is jointly performed by DLR, ESG GmbH, DFS and EADS Military Air Systems.  
In its phase 3, the Wasla/HALE project focuses on the investigation of the "Sense & Avoid" capability in non-
cooperative environments. 
This paper outlines the results of the requirements analysis for a "Sense & Avoid" system for UAVs. 
It summarizes customer and certification requirements and concludes technical and functional requirements. 
The paper defines the elements of the functional chain from first detection of an object to successful avoidance, 
specifies the key functions and derives an overall time budget. Special attention has been paid on the 
involvement of the UAV operator and the autonomous behaviour in case of data link loss or latency. It proposes 
a method to handle cooperative and non-cooperative objects and to derive avoidance advisories thereof. This 
will be complemented by a description of the design concept for an advanced avoidance subsystem operating in 
guided and autonomous mode. The paper summarizes the results of the technology assessment performed to 
identify suitable sensor systems as well as avoidance algorithms.  
Finally, the paper defines the way ahead with the implementation of the experimental “Sense & Avoid” system 
and the proposed simulation and flight test campaigns. 
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Introduction 
Three years ago, the project Wasla/HALE was 
presented on the UAV Conference in Bristol [1]. 
At that time, the Wasla/HALE project in its phase 
2 assessed techniques and procedures required for 
the operation of UAVs in controlled airspace.  
One big finding of this phase 2 was that the 
capability to "Sense & Avoid" conflicting traffic 
was the major question to be solved. 
Consequently, the BWB launched the phase 3 of 
this program in 2005 to address the investigation of 
the "Sense & Avoid" (S&A) capability in 
cooperative and non-cooperative environments. 
At the start of phase 3, the main focus was laid on a 
requirement analysis to consolidate customer and 
certification requirements applicable for the 
Sense&Avoid capability for MALE and HALE 
UAVs operated under IFR and to specify 
functional and technical requirements of a generic 
Sense&Avoid system.  
Later in the Program, an experimental 
Sense&Avoid system dedicated to the assessment 
of critical system capabilities will be prepared and 
tested in simulator campaigns and using flight trials 
to gain experience and to validate the established 
requirements.  
Status of the project 
During the phase 2 of the UAV-demonstration 
project the DLR test aircraft ATTAS (Advanced 
Technologies Testing Aircraft System) was 
equipped with UAV-specific systems like control 
data link, communication data-link and onboard 
intelligent UAV-systems, see Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Experimental UAV-System ATTAS 
The experimental UAV-system was completed by 
two UAV ground control stations, one located at 
Braunschweig, the homebase of the ATTAS 
aircraft, and the other at the Federal Armed Forces 
Flight Test Center at Manching in the southern part 
of Germany. With this configuration several flights 
from Braunschweig to Manching and inverse as 
well as special flights from Manching 
demonstrating emergency procedures like guidance 
data link loss, TCAS-event and rerouting because 
of adverse weather were performed, using the 
general German airspace while controlled from one 
of the ground control stations, see Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: UAV Test flights using ATTAS 
For phase 3 of the demonstration project, one 
major point of interest is the so far not solved 
Sense & Avoid problem of UAV’s. For the best 
performance of such a system it is essential to have 
one ore more sensors with the maximum detection 
range, high resolution and reliability and minimum 
weight and costs. Depending on the physical 
principle the possible candidates for sensing have 
advantages and disadvantages. Figure 3 shows the 
characteristics of possible sensor types. 
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Figure 3: Characteristics of possible sensors 
The characteristics of all sensors were weighted in 
the sense of the overall performance of the 
complete system. The system must be commercial 
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 of the shelf, because new developments of sensors 
were not the aim of the project. It was decided to 
use a combination of an optical and a radar sensor, 
because both sensors complement one another in 
their characteristics for instance the radar systems 
needs a lot of power and the TV-systems needs 
less.  Figure 4 is showing the installation of both 
sensors below a modified radom of the ATTAS 
aircraft.  
 
Figure 4: Sense & Avoid Sensor Integration 
These sensors will be tested in three flight test 
campaigns in 2007 with real flight conflicts 
generated by a non cooperative test aircraft. 
Sense&Avoid Requirements Analysis 
The definition of certification requirements 
applicable for UAV operation as a whole and for 
Sense & Avoid in particular has been a key issue 
since the benefits of operating UAVs were 
identified. This chapter summarizes the most 
important certification requirements applicable to a 
S&A system. 
„... regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual 
flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each 
person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid 
other aircraft ...“ ("FAR Part 91.113 – „Right of 
Way Rules“) 
In controlled airspace, the separation to other 
objects is ensured by compliance with ATC 
instructions or consideration of ATC provided 
traffic information. 
The S&A system shall be used as an independent 
means to detect conflicting traffic and against non-
equipped VFR objects that are not controlled by 
ATC. 
„Approvals for ROA operations should require the 
proponent to provide the ROA with a method that 
provides an equivalent level of safety, comparable 
to see-and-avoid requirements for manned 
aircraft.“ (FAA order 7610.4J, Chapter 12, Section 
9; July 2001) 
Unfortunately, the terminology "equivalent level of 
safety" (ELOS) is not clearly defined. In principal, 
there are two methods to ensure ELOS, a capability 
based approach and a safety based approach. The 
capability based method ensures safety by 
requiring capabilities similar to the human pilot. 
Since UAVs will be operated from a remote 
ground control station (GCS), and given the 
transmission delays applicable to the invoked data 
link connections as well as the limited situational 
awareness of the UAV operator, it becomes 
obvious, that the situation controlling a UAV is not 
comparable to the human pilot situation and that 
the capabilities derived from a human pilot might 
not be sufficient for a UAV.  
In contrast, the statistical approach is purely based 
on an evaluation of Mid-Air and Near Mid Air 
Collisions caused by manned A/C. Using such an 
evaluation, a safety requirement can be derived. It 
has been found, that the level of safety for human 
pilots corresponds to 8,57·10-6/FH (AOPA Air 
Safety Foundation). This value would be applicable 
to UAVs as well when requiring an ELOS. 
"Where a UAV pilot-in-command is responsible for 
separation, he should, except for airfield 
operations, maintain a minimum distance of 0.5nm 
laterally and 500ft vertically between his UAV and 
other airspace users, regardless of how the 
conflicting traffic was detected and irrespective of 
whether or not he was prompted by a S&A system." 
(Eurocontrol OAT Task Force, [2]) 
This requirement already establishes separation 
requirements applicable for UAV operation and 
has therefore a direct impact on system design of 
the S&A system. It should be noted that these 
values are applicable whenever the UAV operator 
is responsible for separation. In such situations, the 
UAV might experience non-transponder equipped 
traffic under VFR, but also transponder equipped 
traffic under IFR.  
Involvement of the UAV Operator 
The Eurocontrol UAV OAT Task Force 
established requirements for the operation of 
UAVs under ATC control. One key finding is that 
the UAV shall be primarily operated under 
operator control and shall act autonomously only in 
conditions with data link failure or latency. 
“For ATM purposes, the primary mode of 
operation of a UAV should entail oversight by the 
pilot-in command.” (Eurocontrol OAT Task 
Force,[2]) 
„A back-up mode of operation should enable the 
UAV to revert to autonomous flight in the event of 
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 total loss of control data-link between the pilot-in-
command and the UAV. This back-up mode of 
operation should ensure the safety of other 
airspace users.“ (Eurocontrol OAT Task 
Force,[2]) 
These requirements have to be taken into account 
also for the Sense & Avoid capability, leading to 
the need to inform the operator about the Sense & 
Avoid conflict situation, possible resolution 
advisories as well as the transmission and 
execution of operator commands in a timely 
manner. 
Due to the nature of the data link connections, a 
fall-back mode of operation will be required for the 
UAV to react autonomously on traffic conflicts in 
conditions with data link loss or latency. 
Capability Assessment & Functional Break 
Down 
A “Sense & Avoid” system is characterised 
through its sub-capabilities “Sense” and “Avoid”. 
For a functional breakdown each of these sub-
capabilities were analysed to identify its key 
capabilities according to Figure 5
The “Sense” sub-capability is build of its key 
capabilities “object detection”, “object tracking” 
and “object consolidation” whereas the “Avoid” 
sub-capability is build of its key capabilities 
“conflict detection” and “conflict solution”. 
 
Figure 5: "Sense & Avoid" capabilities 
The sub-capabilities may only be achieved, if the 
corresponding system functions are realised. 
Consequently, a functional break down of basic 
and secondary S&A system functions has been 
generated. Here, basic S&A functions are 
understood as principle functions which in manned 
aircrafts are provided by the pilot whereas in 
unmanned aircrafts operating autonomously they 
have to be totally provided by an onboard system. 
Secondary S&A functions are evolving in the case 
of allocating particular S&A capabilities between a 
S&A system onboard the UAV and a remote pilot 
in a Ground Control Station (GCS).  
Figure 6 illustrates the functional break down of 
the “Sense” and “Avoid” capabilities. The basic 
functions are divided into the functions “Sense” 
and “Avoid”. 
 
Figure 6: Functional Break Down of "Sense & 
Avoid" capabilities 
The basic function “Sense” consists of the 
functions “Data Acquisition” and “Data Processing 
/ Data Fusion”. 
The basic function “Avoid” consists of the 
functions “Estimation of Object Behaviour”, 
“Identification of Separation Violation”, 
“Generation of Avoidance Manoeuvre” and 
“Execution of Avoidance Manoeuvre”. 
In the case where the S&A capabilities are 
distributed between the UAV and the operator on 
the ground the following secondary S&A functions 
can be derived as “Data Transfer between UAV 
and GCS”, “Information Presentation & 
Interaction” and “Functions- & System Status 
Test” which is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Secondary Functions 
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 This approach assures that all UAV system 
functions relevant to provide S&A capabilities are 
considered.   
Functional Allocation and System Concept 
Figure 8 illustrates a system concept and the 
allocation of the identified system functions for a 
Sense & Avoid system. 
The overall system consists of the S&A core 
system for the basic sense and avoid functions and 
dedicated sub functions that are used to transmit 
the information and to provide a HMI to the UAV 
operator and to execute the avoidance manoeuvre 
with the FMS/Autopilot. 
The S&A core system contains a "Sense" 
component and the "Avoid" component. The 
"Sense" component has to be able to detect both, 
cooperative (e.g. using TCAS II) and non-
cooperative objects (using forward looking sensor). 
It is envisaged to consolidate the detected objects 
of both, cooperative and non-cooperative sense 
components and to use this consolidated situational 
picture as an input for the avoidance function to 
elaborate a resolution advisory. 
 
Figure 8: Functional Allocation and System 
Concept 
Since a HALE/MALE UAV with a MTOW > 
5700kg will have to be equipped with TCAS II, 
one has to take into account the handling of TCAS 
Traffic/Resolution Advisories (TA/RA). Since 
TCAS II can only consider Transponder equipped 
A/C, its RA has to be validated for safety against 
non-Transponder equipped objects. This validation 
will have to be done in a common „Avoid“ block 
as illustrated in Figure 8. As for the pilot operating 
an A/C, this common Avoid block must have to 
ability to overrule the TCAS RA, if the TCAS RA 
would lead to a follow-on conflict with a non-
Transponder equipped A/C. In such conditions, the 
avoidance logic must not execute the TCAS RA 
(because the non-Transponder equipped A/C 
would be endangered) nor act against it (because of 
the conflict with the Transponder equipped A/C 
that originally triggered the RA). A reasonable 
solution would be to avoid laterally or to stay at 
level. 
Figure 9 illustrates the time budget of the sub 
functions in the overall S&A process. The major 
contribution is caused by the execution of the 
avoidance manoeuvre itself, with approx. 30s 
duration for a turn manoeuvre (bank angle limited 
to 15deg, conservative approach) and approx. 27s 
for a TCAS II compliant climb manoeuvre (0.25g, 
1500ft/min).  
10) Performance lat./vert. Avoidance Manoeuvre   29.5s / 26.5s
9)  Input from Operator   0.1s
8) Reaction Time Operator 4.0s
7) Output to Operator 0.1s
6)  Transmission LOS D/L 1.0s
5) Generation Avoidance Manoeuvre              0.1s
4) Identification Separation Violation       0.1s
3) Projection Object Behaviour         2.0s
2) Data Fusion           0.1s
1) Data Processing               3.0s
0) TA Time Span      13.0s
Summe 53.0s
Time Budget
Source: based on „Developing Sense & Avoid Requirements for Meeting an Equivalent Level of Safety”, 
17-19 January 2006, Russell Wolfe
10
9
8
7
6
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3
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Figure 9: S&A Time Budget 
The time budget might be split in three parts.  
The UAV operator must be given sufficient time in 
advance to get aware of the potential conflict and 
to avoid conflicting traffic using standard means of 
piloting an UAV before the conflict becomes an 
emergency situation. This time span (element 0) 
corresponds with the time span between the issue 
of a traffic advisory (TA) and the issue of a 
resolution advisory (RA) in TCAS II. 
Part 2 (elements 1 – 9) contains all elements 
necessary to inform the UAV operator of the 
conflict, to suggest a resolution advisory and to 
wait for the authorisation of the RA by the 
operator.  
Part 3 (element 10) consists of the time needed for 
the execution of the avoidance manoeuvre until 
achievement of separation.  
Data Acquisition 
Figure 10 illustrates the conflict geometry 
applicable to a Sense & Avoid system. The future 
behaviour of both A/C is defined by their velocity 
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 vectors. In case of a crash, the objects will 
approach each other using the "collision angle" 
defined below. In contrast, the angle relevant to the 
"Sense" system is the "viewing angle". This angle 
defines the angle, under which the conflicting 
traffic can be seen by the UAV relative to the A/C 
X-axis and corresponds to the native coordinate 
system of the "Sense" components. The range 
vector defines the current separation to the object 
and can be used to derive the closing speed 
between the two objects. 
 
Figure 10: Conflict Geometry and Viewing 
Angle 
For the Field of View, a requirement for the 
azimuth range has been defined in ICAO Annex 2 
to be at least ±110°. Although this requirement was 
originally stated for manned A/C, it has been found 
sufficient for UAVs as well. 
For the elevation, no requirement has been defined 
by certification authorities. However, a value of 
±10° has been found sufficient for manned A/C. 
Again, this value will be used for UAVs as well 
with a design objective of ±15°. 
 
Figure 11: Minimum Detection Distance 
Figure 11 illustrates the required minimum 
detection range for a sensor to achieve the time 
budget defined above depending on collision angle.  
The picture has been generated for an assumed 
object ground speed of 125m/s (maximum allowed 
under VFR). The speed of the UAV itself has been 
varied between 50m/s and 250m/s (exception for 
state A/C), field-of-view restrictions have been 
neglected.  
The small collision angles on the left hand side 
correspond to situations, where the UAV is 
overtaken by another object (UAV speed < object 
speed) or where the UAV is overtaking another 
object (UAV speed > object speed). The conditions 
on the right hand side correspond to a head-to-head 
conflict, in which the closing speeds between both 
A/C reach their maximum values.  
As expected, the required detection range is 
defined by the head-to-head conflict with a 
collision angle of 180°. Under this condition, the 
closing speed between both objects will maximize. 
The required detection distance of approx. 20km 
can be found easily by multiplying the worst-case 
closing speed with the required time budget of 53s. 
Data Fusion 
The availability of redundant sensor measurements 
(TCAS II transponder fixes and non-cooperative 
sensor measurements) leads to the need to 
consolidate the different fixes. The result will be 
more reliable object data that will allow a reduction 
of false alarm rate and an improvement of collision 
avoidance reliability. However, it should be noted 
that the TCAS will only observe transponder 
equipped A/C, hence a consolidation of non-
cooperative A/C will not be possible without 
further sensor information. Figure 12 illustrates the 
different observation volumes for TCAS and non-
cooperative sensor. 
 
Figure 12: Observation Volume and 
Consolidation 
22th Bristol UAV Systems Conference 
  
Estimation of Object Behaviour 
There are two methods to estimate the object 
behaviour, which have been assessed. This first 
method is called “nominal method”. It is based on 
the assumption that the object will continue its 
current behaviour in future. Due to its simple 
principle, this method is easier to implement. The 
fact that the vast majority of objects indeed act 
according to this behaviour model resulted in the 
implementation of this model in the TCAS system.  
However, this approach will require further 
measures to account for objects with rapidly 
changing behaviour, as might be experienced for 
instance with circling gliders. 
Another method would be to allocate a safe volume 
around each identified object and to scale this 
volume depending on the dynamic capabilities of 
the object and the remaining time. This would 
mean that the safe volume covers all positions the 
object could reach within the remaining time span, 
even when considering worst-case aggressive 
behaviour (i.e. ramming attacks). This means that 
the worst-case method is inherently safe.  
Unfortunately, common objects do not behave this 
way. As a consequence, the worst-case method 
would result in an increased amount of false 
alarms. 
Since the size of the observation volume depends 
on object agility, this approach would also require 
the classification of the object into a category (i.e. 
balloon, glider, fighter A/C, etc.). This in turn 
would lead to an increase in the required detection 
accuracy. 
As a consequence, the nominal method has been 
chosen to estimate the object behaviour. The 
implementation of the method and the measures to 
account for rapid changes in object behaviour will 
be defined in the next chapter. 
Identification of Separation Violation 
With the preposition that a UAV has to be 
equipped with TCAS II, it is assumed that the 
overall S&A system functions have to refer and to 
be compatible with the existing ACAS Standard.  
This leads to the application of the TCAS method 
to classify separation violations as illustrated in 
Figure 13. A conflict can escalate into 3 categories: 
• "Traffic Advisory" (TA) category 
If an object enters this outermost category, a traffic 
advisory will be given to the UAV operator. The 
aim of this TA category is to allow the UAV 
operator to identify and to perform suitable 
measures to prevent a further escalation of the 
conflict. 
• "Resolution Advisory" (RA) category 
An object entering this middle category will trigger 
the generation and the issue of an avoidance 
manoeuvre to avoid the conflicting traffic. The 
selected avoidance manoeuvre will be transmitted 
to the UAV operator for authorisation and will be 
executed once the authorisation is received by the 
onboard system.  
• "Autonomous Avoidance" (AA) category 
If an object enters this innermost category without 
the authorisation by the UAV operator to execute 
an avoidance action, the selected avoidance 
manoeuvre is executed autonomously to prevent a 
mid air collision. This category shall be used in 
case of data-link loss or latency and is considered a 
fallback category. 
Traffic Advisory (53s)
Resolution Advisory (40s)
Autonomous Avoidance (30s)
 
Figure 13: Classification of Separation Violation 
The associated time values correspond to the 
“time-to-closest-approach” as known from the 
TCAS system.  
The identification of a separation violation is 
accomplished using a range test and an altitude 
test. 
For the range test, the estimated time to closest 
approach of the objects is derived using Equation 
1.  
( )
rr
mrt aa &⋅−
−= ²²    (1) 
with:  r - consolidated range 
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  ma - lateral dist. to closest approach 
 ta - time to closest approach 
It has to be further investigated, if this equation 
might be used for accelerated movement of objects 
as well or if further measures have to be identified.  
In order to account for slowly approaching objects, 
a second range test is performed to ensure that no 
object penetrates a safety volume around the own 
A/C laterally. The estimated lateral distance to 
closest approach is derived using Equation 2. 
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In addition to the range test, an altitude test is 
performed as well. Equation 3 defines the 
estimated time to co-altitude of the conflicting 
objects. 
.)sgn(
a
aatv −=    (3) 
with: tv - time to co-altitude 
 a - consolidated altitude separation 
 vm - minimum vertical distance 
As with the range test, a further geometric test has 
been implemented to ensure that slowly 
approaching objects will not penetrate the safe 
volume around the own A/C. Equation 4 defines 
the estimated minimum vertical distance between 
the objects.  
am taav ⋅+= &     (4) 
A separation violation is identified, when the 
following criteria are fulfilled: 
• ta < Lateral Time Threshold 
• ma < Lateral Range Threshold  
• 
•
r  < 0 and vm < Altitude Range Threshold 
• 
•
r < 0, tv < Lateral Time Threshold and tv < 
Altitude Time Threshold 
The values for the lateral and vertical thresholds 
(both time and range) are scheduled depending on 
conflict category („Traffic Advisory“, „Resolution 
Advisory“, „Autonomous Avoidance“). 
Furthermore, these thresholds have to be adapted 
according to  
• The UAV performance data to ensure the 
required avoidance capability 
• The aspect that a lateral avoidance will change 
the relative speed between UAV and 
conflicting object 
• The consideration of additional time rates 
required for the data transfer in remote 
guidance. 
Another aspect to be considered is the occurrence 
of multiple collision conflicts. For this purpose a 
prioritisation of the potential collision objects has 
to be performed with respect to the predicted 
shortest time of encounter. Therefore all potential 
threats must be taken into account within a time 
frame. Otherwise a purely sequential solution of 
the conflicts can lead to tightening a particular 
conflict.   
Generation of Avoidance Manoeuvre 
The aim of the Sense & Avoid system is to provide 
sufficient separation to other airspace users. This is 
assured, if a minimum separation of 500ft 
vertically or 0.5 NM laterally [2] can be guaranteed 
at all times. 
The various traffic conflicts can be grouped into 4 
categories: 
• conflict with a single TCAS equipped A/C 
Since the UAV has to be equipped with TCAS II, a 
TCAS RA has to be followed by the UAV. TCAS 
II separation minima shall be achieved. 
• conflict with a single non-transponder 
equipped A/C 
In this conflict, the UAV has to avoid the object 
with the option to perform a vertical avoidance 
manoeuvre according to the TCAS II standard or a 
lateral manoeuvre compliant with the right-of-way 
rules. 
• conflict with multiple non-transponder 
equipped A/C  
According to the priority of the potential 
conflicting objects an avoidance manoeuvre in both 
vertical and lateral direction has to be calculated. 
For this purpose a 3D avoidance space will be 
spanned which has to be cut down to reasonable 
areas by using a heuristical approach considering 
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 the current flight phase/flight state of the UAV, its 
worst case dynamic performance and the 
conformity to the right-of-way rules. 
The computation of a band of 3D-avoidance 
trajectories fitting with the available avoidance area 
are generated in a stepwise process. First vertical 
manoeuvres using TCAS II algorithms are 
calculated. In a second step vertical trajectories will 
be superimposed by lateral manoeuvres which will 
be parameterized via required heading changes 
with maximum bank and roll rate.  
From the available avoidance manoeuvre 
candidates, this trajectory manoeuvre will be 
selected, which provides the highest safety distance 
to the surrounding objects and the minimal 
deviation from the original flight path. 
• conflict with multiple objects (TCAS equipped 
A/C + non-transponder equipped A/C) 
In case of availability of a TCAS RA, the 
avoidance logic has to incorporate this partial 
solution within the computation of the overall 
solution space as described in the previous way. 
This will ensure that the generated avoidance 
manoeuvre is not in contradiction with the TCAS II 
logic which is an essential step, because the TCAS 
equipped platform might not be aware of the non-
transponder equipped A/C at all.  
Performance of Avoidance Manoeuvre 
In the following some general considerations 
concerning the computation of lateral and vertical 
avoidance and its underlying flight dynamics are 
given. 
Figure 14 illustrates the ground track of lateral 
avoidance manoeuvres depending on bank angle. A 
local-geodetic coordinate system has been used to 
assess the time duration to achieve separation. 
The upright axis labelled “X” points towards the 
conflicting object, here in an assumed frontal 
conflict. The orthogonal axis labelled “Y” shows 
the direction, in which the A/C has to turn in order 
to avoid the conflict. The red line is the separation, 
which has to be passed rightwards to continue the 
flight safely. 
 
Figure 14: Lateral Avoidance Manoeuvre 
It should be noted that for the lateral avoidance 
manoeuvre, the time to achievement of separation 
is almost independent on turn radius and on TAS. 
The main dependency is the bank angle used to 
perform the turn manoeuvre. Unfortunately, the 
bank angle is a critical value when the availability 
of LOS data link connection is important. Hence, a 
bank angle of 15° has been used to identify the 
time needed to achieve separation. 
 
Figure 15: Time required for Lateral Avoidance 
Manoeuvre 
Similarly, the time to separation has been assessed 
for a vertical avoidance manoeuvre (climb or 
descend). Since such a manoeuvre can be 
commanded by the TCAS, a TCAS II compliant 
climb manoeuvre (0.25g, 1500ft/min, [3]) has been 
assessed. 
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 With the experience gained during the upcoming 
simulation and flight test campaigns, the currently 
available requirements will be critically re-assessed 
and re-worked where necessary. 
 
Figure 16: TCAS II compliant Vertical 
Avoidance Manoeuvre 
It becomes obvious, that the time to separation is 
limited by the vertical climb rate. An increase of 
the vertical acceleration would not necessarily 
improve the time duration any further.  
Resume 
This paper defines preliminary functional and 
technical requirements for the development of a 
Sense & Avoid system applicable for UAVs. These 
requirements form a baseline for the development 
of an experimental “Sense & Avoid” system with 
limited capabilities to assess the identified critical 
system functions. 
 
 
 
This re-assessment shall take into account the 
results of the demonstration campaigns as well as 
the on-going development of the certification 
regulations for S&A systems. 
 
At the end of Wasla/HALE phase 3 the re-worked 
requirements shall allow to design a UAV S&A 
system minimising the risk for mid-air collisions to 
a level equal or less high than for manned aircrafts. 
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